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CHAPTER XIV 
 
VESNA BOJIČIĆ-DŽELILOVIĆ 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL AID POLICIES- A REVIEW OF THE MAIN ISSUES 
 
1. The Changing Nature of International Aid Policies 
 
International assistance as commonly known came into being as a framework 
aimed at assisting the post World War II reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall 
plan - its main vehicle at the time. Thus, as such it was initially not concerned with the 
issues of long-term development of less developed countries, which in time became its 
main mandate.  Although the institutions and mechanisms of international assistance 
have evolved over time and in many respects adapted to its new mandate, the imprint 
of its original portfolio has remained. This has resulted in concerns and practices of the 
international assistance lobby that have not always been in tune with the needs or 
priorities of aid beneficiaries.  
Foreign aid has gradually become one of the important tools of foreign policy1 in 
the new framework of international relations, which began to take shape in the 
aftermath of World War II. Stemming out of recognition of an increasing worldwide 
interdependence, this new framework postulated provision of aid as one of the main 
facets of the relations between developed and less developed countries.2 The concept 
of international assistance was, at the same time, part of a wider consensus that 
economic growth was a precondition for political stability and that developed countries 
had to take their share of responsibility for assisting the less developed ones in working 
towards this common goal. By the late 1990s this consensus all but evaporated. While 
the economic prosperity-political stability nexus continued to be in the center of 
development debate, there was disagreement on how this relation was operating as 
well as what the role of international assistance was in facilitating these twin goals 
across the developed-underdeveloped countries divide. 
In its initial phase international aid flows were almost exclusively on a bilateral 
basis. This is linked to the motives of international aid, reflecting their intrinsically 
political nature.3 As the scope of international assistance gradually widened, its 
distinguishing feature became the prominent role played by multilateral development 
assistance. This form of aid was typically provided on more favorable terms than 
bilateral aid. It involved a higher grant element and was perceived as having less 
strings attached than bilateral aid. It is this aspect of international assistance, which in 
particular has more recently come under the close scrutiny of a plethora of agents 
associated with the foreign aid regime, questioning its purpose, effectiveness and 
existing mechanisms, and which is for the most part the focus of our attention. The 
                                                             
1 Its worth underlining that aid is only one of the aspects of international relations and that its effectiveness 
can be affected by the decisions taken in other fields. K. Raffer; H.W. Singer (1996), The Foreign Aid 
Business, London, Edward Elgar. 
2 Until late 80s the typical jargon in use was North-South relations or assistance to the Third World.  
3 This is not to deny the importance of humanitarian motives particularly evident in the later stages of 
international assistance such as easing malnutrition, preventing the spread of disease, limiting the 
suffering caused by natural and man- made disasters etc. For an analysis of the pivotal role of national 
interests in defining the foreign aid regimes see S. Hook (1995), National Interests and Foreign Aid, Lynne 
Rienner, Boulder- London. 
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handling of multilateral assistance flows came under the mandate of a number of newly 
established institutions, principally, the United Nations (UN) and the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (subsequently known as the World Bank group). 
Other organizations such as Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD)4, 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were also involved and have continued to 
play a prominent role to this day5.  The role and influence of each of these institutions 
has however changed since their inception. The provision of humanitarian relief 
assistance continued its existence as a more or less separate, and to development 
assistance unrelated, component of the overall international aid effort characteristic of 
the 90s. 
The fact that the origins of and the motives for international assistance are 
primarily political, as a cursory analysis of the history of official development assistance 
would readily confirm,6 is of utmost importance. Combined with the shifts in the 
developed countries’ economic policy priorities, it has had a determining impact on the 
scale and modalities of international assistance, its destination and modes of provision. 
Consequently, the political background of international assistance is one of the key 
factors in understanding the complex nature of relations between aid and development 
and in particular why aid has often failed to achieve its stated goals.   
In the 1950s and 1960s the focus of international development assistance was 
on allegedly supporting the “catching up” process by the less developed countries. The 
emphasis was solely on initiating economic growth, which was thought as best 
achieved by channeling resources into large-scale capital-intensive projects as a 
prerequisite for industrialization as a preferred developmental path. Development was 
conceived of as a technical process of providing the lacking resources and technical 
assistance to the recipient countries and was as such viewed as a manifestly 
nonpolitical affair. This was reflected in the prevalent funding approach adopted by 
most donors and development agencies. During this period the official development 
assistance, either bilateral or provided through multilateral development agencies, was 
the principal source of international finance to less developed countries facing 
restricted access to sources of private capital. It grew significantly in scale and in 
number of both donors as well as recipients, reaching its peak in the mid-70s in terms 
of international public funds transferred from industrialized to developing countries. This 
coincided with a shift in emphasis in the provision of industrialized assistance towards 
meeting basic needs of the population in the less developed countries within the so 
called integrated approach to development whereby growth as such ceased to be the 
main development criteria. Part of this change was enhanced emphasis on the 
development of agriculture and full employment. For most of the period prior to the 70s, 
the governments of recipient countries were among the principal partners to the 
multilateral agencies. This reflected the then prevalent economic doctrine, which 
recognized the developmental role of the state.  
From the mid 70s onwards, the approach changed towards greater 
decentralization in aid delivery. While multilateral aid remained substantial, the role of 
                                                             
4 In the 60s the Organization for European Cooperation was reorganized into the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development reflecting a shift from European post-war reconstruction to 
assistance to less developed countries. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD was 
founded as a coordinating agency for bilateral and multilateral aid from the member countries. 
5 The IMF and the OECD are not development agencies as such but are deeply involved in organizing and 
delivering international assistance. 
6 See: J. Freedman (2000), Transforming Development - Foreign Aid for a Changing World, University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto-London. 
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private capital in international financial flows grew. The real turning point in the 
international assistance, which gave rise to the foreign aid regime of today, occurred in 
the 80s. The two oil-shocks of the 70s7 changed the international economic context; 
after a period of strong economic performance, recession set in. The ascent to power 
of conservative governments in a number of developed countries made the control of 
inflation the key economic policy target. One of the consequences was cutting back 
public expenditures, which had direct effect on the size of official development 
assistance. The decline in the official foreign aid and an increase in the role of private 
capital, which from then on continued apace, profoundly changed the environment in 
which many less developed countries had to fight a debt crisis, while trying to reverse 
economic stagnation.  
The increasingly inward looking attitude of the developed countries brought 
about a change in the mode of their engagement in less developed countries. 
“Catching up” ceased to be the ultimate purpose of development assistance. 
Incompetent economic policies and poor governance in the less developed countries 
were identified as the main culprits for their underdevelopment and large external debt. 
The prescribed cure was a set of radical economic and political reforms, typically 
framed in the IMF and the World Bank’s stabilization and structural adjustment 
programs that many developing countries had undertaken in exchange for international 
financial support8. There was a profound shift in the lending practices of the two 
institutions towards policy lending, which shifted to the financing of economic programs 
monitored by an adequate set of economic policies; this had as its corollary an 
increasing role of conditionality as part of the foreign aid regime9. While foreign aid 
policies had throughout supported the development of open, market-based economic 
systems in borrowers’ countries, this became one of the principal goals from the 80s 
onwards. The policies applied were explicitly aimed at removing the monopoly of state 
in line with the new dominant economic doctrine of neo-liberalism, which on efficiency 
grounds advocated the primacy of markets.10  
The role of the IMF and the World Bank within the international assistance 
framework grew profoundly over the years11 to the point that their seal of approval 
came to be seen as a catalyst12 for bilateral aid and private investment. At the same 
time, the role of the UN in assisting development of the less developed nations gave 
way in importance to those aspects associated with the organization’s security mandate 
such as peacekeeping. This shift was accompanied by a growing role of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). They became one of the main vehicles for 
delivering international assistance, particularly in those situations when local 
governance was problematic. The growing role of NGOs, both international as well as 
local, coincided with an increase in welfare needs of the local population as a result of 
                                                             
7 The oil-producing countries raised the prices of oil sharply first in 1973 and then in 1979-80. 
8  V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2000), p. 99 
9 The recipient countries found themselves entangled in the cross-conditionality between the IMF and the 
World Bank which served to facilitate other capital flows; in addition they also had to accept a tacit 
conditionality of aid linked to the participation of companies from donor countries in providing aid. 
10 For an argument pointing at the ideological underpinnings of the policy advice accompanying aid see: J. 
Mosley at al (1995), Aid and Power: The World Bank Policy Based Lending, London, Routledge; A. 
Amsden at al (1994), The Market Meets its Match: Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
11 Their influence on developed countries at the same time became virtually non-existent. 
12 It is questionable whether the IMF and the World Bank credit are truly catalysts of other financial flows. 
See: G. Bird; A. Mori; D. Rowlands (2000), Do the multilaterals catalyze other capital flows? A case study 
analysis, Third World Quarterly, Vol 21, No. 3 
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structural adjustment programs13. They were increasingly perceived as an effective and 
less expensive mechanism of delivering assistance compared to inflexible and costly 
government administrations or that of the UN, in the view of the increasingly complex 
tasks facing development agencies. By the late 1980s the government funding of 
NGOs had increased sharply. 
These trends were reinforced in the 90s as the Cold War era drew to a close. 
The largest drop in official development assistance was recorded in this period, while 
private flows rocketed, reflecting, on the one hand, disillusionment with aid and 
changed international finance context, on the other. In 1995-96 private flows surpassed 
public development assistance flows for the first time since World War II, reflecting the 
clear inclination among donors to integrate aid into other flows of capital between 
developed and less-developed countries. This has had important repercussions on the 
development assistance agenda. The period after the Cold War has witnessed 
widening of development assistance agenda to the issues of democratization, reflecting 
the rise of a new orthodoxy about the developmental role of political regimes.14 This 
was aptly manifested in conditions attached to the provision of international assistance, 
which expanded to include issues such as transparency, accountability and the rule of 
law - the crux of a “good governance” agenda as it became commonly referred to. 
Good government was recognized as playing a vital role in the establishment of a legal 
and regulatory framework enabling efficient functioning of the market and provision of 
public goods.15  This represented a departure from the orthodox approach of the two 
previous decades in that it emphasized the crucial role of the state and institutions in 
general for the development of a modern market economy and democratic political 
system. This, however, is often overlooked in critiques of foreign aid mainly because 
the economic core of the assistance framework – that of stabilization and structural 
adjustment – has remained more or less the same.16 At the same time, a framework 
that would bind all these considerations into a consistent approach is missing.  
At the close of the 20th century multilateral assistance encompassed: socio-
economic development; democratic governance; humanitarian aid and peacekeeping. 
A number of former socialist countries of Eastern Europe undergoing economic and 
political transition were added to the list of recipients17. A particularly important feature 
of the changing composition of international aid flows was a sharp rise in the proportion 
of emergency relief compared to development aid. This was partly a consequence of 
the proliferation of internal conflicts in various parts of the world, including Africa, 
Central Asia, Transcaucasus and the Balkans. Problems facing most of the affected 
countries were subsumed in the term “complex emergency”18, which was deployed to 
describe a situation of a profound economic, social and institutional dissolution caused 
by a multiplicity of factors. One of the common points in all cases was that the crisis 
occurred against the background of failed development, which sheds a different light on 
the mentioned changes in the composition of foreign aid. One could argue that 
precisely because the development aid was insufficient and/or inadequate, it gave rise 
                                                             
13 According to I. Smillie, the three major functions of NGOs are: as service providers, as civil society and 
as “balm for the troubled conscience”. See: I. Smillie In J. Freedman, op.cit. 
14 G. White (1997), Constructing a Democratic Developmental State, (Draft) Mimeo. 
15 J. Harris (ed) (1995), The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, London-New York, Pinter Pub; p. 2 
16 It was made a central tenet of the transition agenda of the former socialist countries, which to various 
degree was supported by the international financial institutions. 
17 Some of these countries were beneficiaries of the multilateral development assistance before. 
18 M. Duffield (1994), Complex Political Emergencies with Reference to Angola and Bosnia: An Exploratory 
Report for UNICEF. Geneva; UNICEF. 
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to increasing demand for emergency relief – hence an increase in its share in total aid 
flows.   
The humanitarian response that followed was largely based on the experience 
of natural disasters and concerned with alleviating suffering of the victims in the first 
place. It reflected a fundamental misconception of the true nature of the problem, which 
above all was political. It failed to grasp that rather than being a temporary interruption 
in the society’s development trajectory, the "complex emergencies" produce alternative 
socio-economic formations which, although at odds with common economic and 
political norms and practices, are capable of surviving, often using violent means. 
Humanitarian aid has often been appropriated by these structures, remaining largely 
irrelevant in addressing the causes of the organized social violence. The response to 
"complex emergencies" challenged the international assistance framework; it called into 
question the existing approach based on the separation of humanitarian and 
development aid as well as their effectiveness. It was a watershed suggesting that 
substantial change was needed with regard to the approach, the mechanisms and the 
role and relations among key agents engaged in providing international assistance.  
 
 
2. Some Common Points of Criticism 
 
The international assistance regime has been subject of an ongoing inquiry by 
various interested parties; there exists a substantial body of literature on the subject, 
particularly on the role and practice of the IMF and the World Bank. The ambition of this 
part of the study is modest and very specific: to point out some of these criticisms, 
which bear particular resonance with the experience of the international assistance to 
South- East Europe. In the debates on international assistance there has often been 
too much emphasis on the issue of the financial scale of aid both from the perspective 
of donors as well as recipients. The amounts of aid involved have been used as a main 
variable in decisions pertaining to particular cases of assistance, and in particular in 
assessing the effectiveness of aid. The experience of foreign aid however suggests 
that although the quantity of aid is important,19 its impact will ultimately depend on who 
controls and utilizes the aid. Thus, in negotiating aid programs as well as in evaluating 
the impact of aid, it is far more relevant to look at the institutions utilizing the aid as well 
as at the particular circumstances in which they operate.20   
The issue of quality of aid is intrinsically related to that of the design of aid 
programs. The role local parties play in this process, the critics argue, is of paramount 
importance for the success of the programs - the critical variable being the concept of 
"ownership" of the assistance program. This is one of the particularly controversial 
points in the debate on international assistance. The World Bank, the UNDP, the IMF, 
and via them, the donor community at large have been criticized for imposing a policy 
agenda on the recipient countries, which, in need of their support, have restricted 
space for self- initiative (the "donor-driven" agenda). This then results in an inadequate 
choice of policy priorities, instruments, implementing structures, etc. - the list of criticism 
on this is a long one. The precise extent to which this objection is valid hinges on 
                                                             
19 It is worth pointing out that the evidence on how much of the disbursed amounts is effectively utilized by 
local beneficiaries compared to foreign implementing agencies, foreign consultants, etc is scant; thus the 
nominal amounts of aid as such can be misleading.   
20 The multilateral agencies under pressure to disburse the funds often do so through arrangements with 
the government institutions, local development bank etc, which may not necessarily be best placed to use 
it efficiently. S. Hellinger et al (1988), op.cit 
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particular circumstances. For example, there might be a case of a "policy vacuum" on 
the recipient side in that it lacks the capacity to design an appropriate program; or that 
the beneficiary government is not interested in the program as such but principally in 
funds. In either case, talking about "ownership" misses the point. Nevertheless, 
however, it is fair to say that the donors do have decisive influence on the design of the 
program and the financial terms attached to it. Be that as it may, since "he who pays 
the piper calls the tune", the fact is that without participation of the relevant local actors, 
it is difficult to solicit an adequate local commitment, which is crucial for successful 
implementation of the program. It is not that the multilateral agencies, albeit with a 
significant delay, have not acknowledged the importance of "local ownership" and 
participation; in reality, however the support for genuinely local approaches is largely 
absent.   
Another line of criticism extends to the fact that the content of the program 
supported by foreign assistance can have a decisive influence on economic and social 
relations of the recipient country. Thus, decisions on aid are political in nature. It is 
therefore important that the aid program be embedded within the country's 
development strategy framework, which for various reasons, including those discussed 
in the previous section, is often not the case. It is not uncommon, as Freedman21 points 
out, that internationally supported projects exist as islands within the local economy and 
society unconnected to local development processes. It is against this background that 
the most common criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF-supported programs have 
been launched. Both institutions have been criticized for having too narrow focus on 
financial aspects of economic adjustment policies, at the expense of their wider social 
and economic implications. Once the macroeconomic considerations are attended to, 
what the reforms attempted by the recipients amount to is no less than an 
"overwhelming set of societal transformations".22 The question that naturally follows is 
one of the local capacity to pursue the reforms to this end and the controversial role 
played by conditionality23. The thrust of the criticism here is the absence and/or 
weakness of adequate institutions in the recipient countries on which the 
implementation of the reform depends. Another important point is that it is not taken 
into account at all how the reforms supported by the international assistance reflect 
upon the institutional capacity itself. It may well be that external involvement further 
undermines already weak institutions. The principal objection that critics of foreign aid 
often make to the content of the program and conditionality accompanying it is that 
insufficient attention has been devoted to the issues of institutional design and 
institution building, which have to be adapted to local circumstances. There are simply 
no ready-made blue prints in this respect, which puts a question mark on the validity of 
the agenda pursued by the multilateral agencies and their potential to deliver in this 
particular respect. Equally important are resource constraints, particularly human 
capital, where, it has been suggested, technical assistance as part of the aid program 
often substitutes for, rather than building upon, local skills and resources.24  Missing 
these two points may lock the countries in a vicious circle of weak institutions and 
prolonged aid dependence.  
                                                             
21 J.Freedman,op.cit, p. 87 
22 M. Naim in World Development (2000), op.cit. p. 522  
23 One line of argument questions the necessity of conditionality per se if the recipient country considers 
the propositions of the aid program in its best interest.  See: K. Raffer et al, op.cit. p. 158 
24 S. Hellinger, op.cit. It has been often pointed out that in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo there is a 
widespread practice of international agencies recruiting local professionals for lower skills jobs. 
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One criticism regarding conditionality, which is directly related to the issue of 
local reform capacity, is that all too often there is an inherent contradiction in the two. 
Some of the conditions simply presuppose features of the local economy and society 
which do not exist and are yet to be built with the help of international assistance. 
These include, for example, a reasonably developed financial system, professional 
standards, a functioning public administration, civil society, which would make local 
governments accountable, etc25. The problem is further complicated by the fact that 
conditionality usually applies to policy makers, which may not necessarily be interested 
in meeting those conditions26. In a particular political context, failure to meet conditions 
and the ensuing sanctions by the donors, serves the local political elite as a way to 
escape from the responsibility for the country's poor economic performance, dismal 
human rights record, etc.  As far as the agencies involved are concerned, broadening 
conditionality from economic governance to political reforms creates inconsistencies 
with the non-political mandate of the international financial institutions.27   
Most assessments of the effectiveness of foreign aid have concentrated on its 
impact on growth and poverty. As yet, clear evidence is lacking for the link between aid 
and development. Experience of many countries benefiting from foreign aid suggests 
that often aid has led to the concentration of power and wealth, rather than contributing 
to equity and reduction in poverty. Few countries have managed to sustain growth 
necessary to continue economic reforms; many have developed an aid dependency 
with negative long-term economic consequences. 
The role of humanitarian aid28 and its relation with development assistance has 
been of a particular concern of aid critics recently. Some of the objections raised 
regarding the humanitarian response to complex political emergencies have been 
briefly summarized in section 1 of this chapter. The main criticism on the issue of the 
relations between the two is that the international actors engaged in the aid effort have 
failed to understand the fact that how humanitarian aid is implemented can have a 
crucial impact on the success of development aid. Not enough thought has been given 
to the issue of how immediate humanitarian goals relate to the wider social, cultural, 
political and economic dimension of long-term stability and sustainable development 
needed if the conditions which prompted the intervention are not to recur.29 Another 
unattended issue is that of accountability of the humanitarian action, given the 
particular circumstances in response to which humanitarian aid is typically provided, 
such as collapsed states, violence, large-scale movement of population, etc.   
The last of the common criticisms of foreign aid that we want to point out here 
regards the relations between a plethora of actors involved in international assistance. 
Whether one is talking about the UN, the World Bank, the NGOs or other relevant 
actors, there has been a common trend of an ever-increasing agenda of action over the 
last 50 years. The spectrum of issues covered by each of the institutions involved is so 
                                                             
25 Some critics go as far as to say that were these features present, international assistance would not be 
needed in the first place. See: J. Harris, op.cit, p. 2 
26 G. White makes a point that at times of a regime change, the decisions about basic democratic 
institutions tend to be taken by political forces motivated by their own interests and not some larger 
commitment to democracy; this then has important implications to the degree of commitment to 
implementing the reform agendas.  op.cit, p. 24 
27 See: J. Harris, op.cit 
28 The issues surrounding humanitarian aid have attracted much discussion in various academic fields, 
opening some serious questions such as its role (as by definition an impartial and neutral mechanism) in 
relation to the political goals of the international interventions.   
29 O. Ramsbotham et al (1996), Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict – A 
Reconceptualisation, London, Polity Press, p. 222 
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wide that there is a large degree of overlap. Rather than cooperating, these agencies in 
the event compete with each other as well as with the private sector, which undermines 
the efficacy of the foreign assistance and the impact it has on the recipient country. 
 
 
3. Understanding the Salient Features of South East Europe's Reality  
 
As suggested in chapter II, South East Europe is a diverse grouping of 
countries, which individually face somewhat different set of opportunities and 
constraints regarding economic development and democratization - the two commonly 
understood core concerns at this contemporary junction. This refers to their particular 
internal circumstances as well as relations with the European Union as one of the 
principal external players in the area. However, there is a number of fundamentally 
common issues that apply across the board, which would suggest that these 
differences are rather a matter of degree30 and that it is possible to conceive of a 
relevant strategy for the region as a whole.   
The countries of South East Europe have often been mistakenly treated in a 
rather similar fashion to the rest of Eastern Europe’s former communist countries 
undergoing economic and political transition. The historical, socio-economic, political 
and ideological legacies were too easily dismissed, which became more than obvious 
when these countries failed to stabilize after the upheaval caused by the demise of 
communism. One of the region's specificity with far reaching implications on the 
prospects for its economic and political stabilization is that in some of the areas there 
continues a process of state and/or nation building navigated by the forces of 
exclusionary ethnic nationalism. Thus violence and conflict are latently present in the 
region, as is proneness to further disintegration. As a consequence, the region's 
overwhelming concern is to do with security matters; the lack of clear borders and the 
absence of the rule of law present major security threats impinging on the region's 
economic and democratic consolidation. The dominant approach, as discussed in 
chapter II, as well as in the first section of this chapter, has been one of pushing for 
market reform and multiparty democracy in exchange for international assistance. The 
problem seems to be that in the case of South East Europe there has been no clear 
vision on how to go about linking the two; in reality economic instruments have been 
used to achieve political and security goals, which has not produced the desired 
results. The Stability Pact for South East Europe appears to be the first international 
initiative that recognizes the intricate link between security, economics and politics; 
whether this will be reflected in its operationalization is still early to say.   
In spite of an experience of forced industrialization in most of its countries, the 
region is predominantly a developing one; before the dismantling of communism, 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were the poorest countries of Europe. 
Moreover, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania practiced a particularly austere variant of a 
command system, which left these countries with a legacy of severely distorted 
economies, lack of trust in institutions and their credibility. Thus both economic as well 
as political problems of underdevelopment are perennial in the region31. Corruption, 
weak or collapsing institutions, low social cohesion are some of the problems typically 
                                                             
30 See: V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (1997), Bosnia-Herzegovina - An Extreme Case of Transition in the Balkans in 
S. Bianchini; M. Uvalic (eds), The Balkans and the Challenge of Economic Integration - Regional and 
European Perspectives, Ravenna, Longo Editore 
31 For a comprehensive assessment see: V. Gligorov; M. Kaldor; L. Tsoukalis (1999) 
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associated with South East Europe, which are ominous indicators of its weak capacity 
to cope with pressures for change, whether these are internal or external. One of the 
region's monumental tasks is rebuilding its capacity to produce and to reinsert itself into 
the international division of labor on terms different from the communist era. The 
"transitional agenda" for its part has downplayed the importance of developmental 
challenge facing the region. 
Ten years of the wars in the region have added to the region's specific set of 
problems. Wars brought about large-scale physical destruction, including that of major 
infrastructure linking parts of the region with the rest of Europe, thus contributing to the 
sense of physical isolation. The existing production and commercial links were severed, 
aggravating the already difficult process of adaptation to changed economic incentives 
and trade prospects, as manifested in the persistence of very high unemployment, 
unsustainable public finance, large current account deficit and growing foreign 
indebtedness.  Informalization of the economy has not only undermined the state's 
economic capacity, but has had a corrosive effect on the social and moral fabric of the 
society already strained by years of economic deprivation and populist politics. There 
has been a profound depletion of human capital through population displacement and 
an ongoing brain drain of the young and educated. This suggests that there is a major 
dilemma and a problem with identifying actors of change, i.e., those forces which can 
formulate and push through an appropriate reform agenda. It is too simplistic to 
suppose that the political elite in the region as a rule harbors genuine zeal for 
democracy and orderly economic relations.   
The relations between the countries in the region are complex, and in some 
instances very tense, not least because of the unresolved issue of borders. The history 
of mutual cooperation is poor; the approach to the region has traditionally been geo-
political, guided by the interests of individual countries from outside the region, which 
has often pitted South East European countries against each other and made them 
compete for international support. The existence of diverse relations with the EU 
appears to be working in the same direction; there is a widespread perception that 
forging regional cooperation might be at the expense of the individual countries' 
prospects of joining Europe. Thus, at the present stage there seems to be an 
antagonism between the bilateral32 and regional approach (the latter one only in the 
making), which external agents practice in various areas of assistance. This is 
counterproductive to a long-term agenda of nurturing cohesion in the region around 
common issues of security, political stability and economic prosperity. 
 
 
4. Recommendations 
 
Taking as a vantage point the particular concerns of South East Europe, the 
analysis of some of the main issues surrounding the role and practice of international 
assistance has provided a background against which a number of relevant points for 
research on lessons learned can be made: 
 
4.1. It is important to look at the content of the program associated with the foreign 
aid: does it reflect the priorities of the recipient country as well as its capacity to 
                                                             
32 An example are structural adjustment programs, which are negotiated on a country-by-country basis and 
can be an obstacle to regional cooperation aiming at a particular trade arrangement.   
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implement it? There has to be a shift towards greater cooperation between donors and 
recipients in defining the program.   
 
4.2. Identifying the key interlocutors in defining and implementing the program of 
assistance is crucial for its success.   
 
4.3.  Conditionality ought to be reconsidered so that it is not unilateral, instrument-
oriented and rigid; active involvement of the recipient is essential. 
 
4.4. The main tenets of the good government agenda promoted by the international 
donors, i.e., participation, transparency and accountability ought to apply to the donors 
themselves as well as to the international aid agencies. 
 
4.5. Expansion of the international aid agenda requires reconsideration of inter-
agency relations; specifically, the UN has to step up its involvement as the issues such 
as democratization, human rights and civil society fall outside the realm of the 
international financial institutions. The role of NGOs in relation to the other agencies 
and donor countries has to be looked at, too.  
 
4.6. There is a need for more harmonization of bilateral and regional assistance. 
Also, based on the experience of Marshal aid, promoting regional cooperation requires 
joint assessment by the recipients of their needs and requests as well as the installation 
of a principle of self-monitoring.   
  
4.7. Providing humanitarian aid cannot be a substitute for development-oriented aid; 
the two are closely related and have to be addressed within a single framework.   
 
4.8.  International assistance has to be seen as a medium facilitating improved 
access for its beneficiaries to market, capital and technology, which is essential for 
sustaining their development in the long run.   
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